EVIDENCE-HYPNOSIS-UNCONSTITUTIONAL

FOR STATE TO

AP-

PLY Per Se RULE TO EXCLUDE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT'S HYPNOTICALLY ENHANCED

TESTIMONY.

Rock v. Arkansas, 107

S. Ct.

2704 (1987).
Attempts to introduce hypnotically adduced testimony into
criminal proceedings are not a recent phenomenon. As early as
1898, in People v. Ebanks,' a defendant on trial for murder at-

tempted to prove his innocence by calling a hypnosis expert to
the stand.2 The hypnotist testified that the defendant had cate-

gorically denied his guilt while in a hypnotic trance.'

The trial

court refused to admit the testimony on the ground that this

would constitute an "illegal defense" because the "law of the
United States does not recognize hypnotism."'

Since the decision in Ebanks, the use of hypnosis as a scientific method of proof has been debated extensively in courts
throughout the United States.5 Unlike the circumstances in
Ebanks, the debate has focused on the admissibility of the hypnotically refreshed recollection of crime victims and witnesses." Pro1 117 Cal. 652, 49 P. 1049 (1897).
2 Id. at 665, 49 P. at 1053.
3

Id.

4 Id.
5' See generally Diamond, Inherent Problems in the Use of PretrialHtypnosis on a Prospective Il'itness, 68 CAL. L. REV. 313 (1980); Orne, The Use and Misuse of Hypnosis in Court,
27 INT'LJ. CLIN. & Exp. Hyp. 311 (1979); Putnam, Hypnosis and Distortions in Eyewitness lemori', 27 INT'LJ. CLIN. & Exp. Hyp. 437 (1979) (articles dealing with the use
of hypnosis as a method of proof). See also infra notes 91-160 and accompanying
text for an in-depth discussion of the use of hypnosis as a method of proof in court.
6 More often than not, the prosecution attempts to introduce the hypnoticallyrefreshed recollection of a crime victim or a witness to a crime. See, e.g., State v.
Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 530, 432 A.2d 86, 88 (1981); People v. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d 523,
529, 466 N.Y.S.2d 255, 257, 453 N.E.2d 484, 486 (1983); State v. Glebock, 616
S.W.2d 897, 903 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981); State v. Armstrong, 110 Wis.2d 555,
559-60, 329 N.W.2d 386, 389 (1983); Haselhuhn v. State, 727 P.2d 280, 281 (Wyo.
1986); Chapman v. State, 638 P.2d 1280, 1281 (Wyo. 1982).
However, there are a number of cases that deal with the question of whether a
criminal defendant may call an expert hypnotist to the stand in order to have the
expert attest to the defendant's innocence. See, e.g.,Jones v. State, 542 P.2d 1316
(Okla. Crim. App. 1975). In that case, a defendant had been found guilty of firstdegree murder and sentenced to death. Id. at 1319. As part of his defense, the
defendant introduced the testimony of a licensed medical doctor who specialized in
hypnosis. Id. at 1326. The trial court established that the doctor, if allowed to take
the stand, would testify that he believed that the defendant had been telling the
truth when he professed his innocence while under hypnosis. Id. The trial court
refused to allow the testimony to be introduced. Id. In upholding the trial court's
decision, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals stated that attempts to introduce the hypnotist's testimony as a method of establishing the truth of statements
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ponents argue that hypnosis is an effective and proven method of
restoring a witness' memory loss. 7 Opponents contend, however, that hypnosis is inherently unreliable because of the possibility of inaccurate results produced by hyper-suggestibility,
confabulation," and increased confidence in the recall (whether
genuine or invented) which occur during the hypnotic process.'1
These divergent views have resulted in courts adopting four
distinct approaches in deciding whether hypnotically adduced
testimony is admissible.'' This article traces these various approaches, culminating in the 1987 United States Supreme Court
decision in Rock v. Arkansas,' " which invalidated a state's adoption
and application of a rule of per se inadmissibility of hypnotic evi3
dence when used by a criminal defendant.'1
4
Vickie Lorene Rock did not want her husband Frank to die.'
She begged the officers who arrived at the apartment to "please
save him."' 5 In a distraught state, Mrs. Rock told the investigatoffered by the defendant was comparable to admitting the results of lie detectors or
truth serum tests. Id. at 1326-27.
See also Warner, The Use of Hypnosis in the Defense of Criminal Cases, 27 INT'L J.
CuN. & Exp. HYP. 417 (1979) (survey of cases dealing with the admissibility of
hypnotically-adduced evidence when offered by criminal defendants).
7 See State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 537, 432 A.2d 86, 92 (1981).
8 Hyper-suggestibility refers to the fact that a person under hypnosis is very
susceptible to suggestions made either consciously or unconsciously by the hypnotist or others who participate in the process. People v. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d 523,
534-35, 466 N.Y.S.2d 255, 260, 453 N.E.2d 484, 489 (1983).
) Confabulation is a process "whereby a person who is under substantial pressure to remember a perception, such as details of the appearance of an assailant,
but in fact had no perception to remember, is encouraged to unconsciously manufacture those details from her other experiences or her imagination." Contreras v.
State, 718 P.2d 129, 132 n.8 (Alaska 1986) (quoting State v. Contreras, 674 P.2d
792, 808 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983)). See also Orne, supra note 5, at S18, 333-34; Putnam, supra note 5, at 437 (experimental study illustrating the problems of inaccurate recall in criminal investigations).
10 In State v. Peoples, 311 N.C. 515, 523, 319 S.E.2d 177, 182 (1984), the North
Carolina Supreme Court asserted that it was "virtually impossible for the subject or
even the trained professional hypnotist to distinguish between true memory and
pseudo memory." Id.
The New York Court of Appeals, relying on the results of several experiments
conducted by scientists, found that hypnotized persons exhibited convincing recall
of events that "happened" in the future. People v. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d 523, 535,
466 N.Y.S.2d 255, 260, 453 N.E.2d 484, 489-90 (1983).
See also Diamond, supra note 5, at 339-40.
11 See infra notes 91-97 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of these
four approaches.
12 107 S. Ct. 2704 (1987).
13 Id. at 2714-15.
14
15

Id. at 2706.
Id.
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ing officers how and why she shot her husband.' According to
the testimony of one officer, Mrs. Rock explained that she and
her husband had argued.' 7 She tried to leave the apartment, but
he choked her.' 8 She picked up a gun and pointed it at the
floor.'
When he hit her again, she shot him. 2 0 Mr. Rock died
from the bullet wound to the chest.2 ' Mrs. Rock was charged
22
with manslaughter.
Faced with a client who was unable to recall specific details
of the shooting, Mrs. Rock's attorney suggested hypnosis to refresh Mrs. Rock's memory. 23 Dr. Betty Back, a neuropsychologist, interviewed Mrs. Rock for one hour before hypnosis. 24 Mrs.
Rock related all that she could remember of the shooting and Dr.
Back carefully recorded her narrative in a notebook. 2 ' The account added nothing new to Mrs. Rock's statement at the site of
the killing.2" However, after two sessions under hypnosis, both
recorded on tape, Mrs. Rock remembered crucial details about
the shooting. 27 She remembered that while her thumb held the
28
gun's hammer, she had not held a finger on the trigger.
Equally important, she remembered that "the gun had discharged when her husband grabbed her arm during the scuffle. '2 As a result of these details, Mrs. Rock's counsel engaged a
gun specialist to examine the weapon."' The specialist found the
gun defective: the gun had a tendency to fire, "when hit or
'
dropped, without the trigger[] being pulled."' 3
When the prosecuting attorney learned about the results of
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
I.)Id.

Id. A second officer gave a slightly different version of Mrs. Rock's statement
at the scene. Id. at 2706 n.1.According to him, Mrs. Rock stated that she grabbed
the gun during the struggle with her husband, and that "the gun went off" after she
told him to leave her alone. Id. Mrs. Rock also purportedly stated that "it was an
accident and she didn't mean to shoot him." Id.
21 Id. at 2706.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id. Dr. Back testified that she was a licensed neuropsychologist with training
in the field of hypnosis. Id.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 2706-07.
27 Id. at 2707.
28 Id.
29 Id.
")Id. The handgun was a single action Hawes .22 Deputy Marshal. Id.
2)

Ild.
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the hypnosis, he filed a motion to exclude the new details from
Mrs. Rock's testimony: 2 In the pre-trial order, the judge acknowledged that Dr. Back had not used leading questions to ex33
act biased responses from Mrs. Rock while under hypnosis.
Despite this finding, the trial judge ruled that all testimony resulting from Mrs. Rock's hypnotically refreshed recollection
would be excluded. 4 Specifying the "inherent unreliability" of
hypnosis as a rationale, the trial judge also stated that testimony
given as the result of hypnosis 5 "eliminated meaningful cross3
examination on those matters."
At trial, the defense established the gun's defect by calling
the weapons expert."' Mrs. Rock also took the stand, but, because of the pre-trial order, she was interrupted by the prosecutor's objections every time she said more than a few words. 7
The judge limited Mrs. Rock's testimony to a "reiteration of the
sketchy information in Dr. Back's notes. ' ' "X A jury found Mrs.
Rock guilty of manslaughter and she was sentenced to a ten-year
prison term with a $10,000 fine.'
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the trial
court's ruling.4" Following other jurisdictions which have held
that hypnotically adduced evidence from a witness other than the
criminal defendant is inadmissible per se, the court concluded
that the danger of admitting such evidence outweighs its protected probative value. 4 1 While recognizing Mrs. Rock's fundamental right to testify on her own behalf, the court decided that
the exclusion of hypnotically induced details did not conflict with
this constitutional guarantee.42 In conclusion, the Arkansas
Supreme Court held that any prejudice or deprivation suffered
by Mrs. Rock was slight and the product of her own actions
rather than the result of any error committed by the trial court.4 3
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 44 to deId.
Id. at 2707 n.3.
'34 Id. at 2707.
:35 Id. at 2707 n.3.
32
3

'3 1d.

Id. at 2707 n.4.
:3 Id. at 2707.
37

39 Id.

4( Rock v. State, 288 Ark. 566, 568, 708 S.W.2d 78, 79 (1986).
41 See id. at 575, 708 S.W.2d at 83 (citing People v. Shirley, 31 Cal.3d 18, 181
Cal. Rptr. 243, 641 P.2d 775 (1982)).
42 Id. at 578-80, 708 S.W.2d at 84-86.
43 Id. at 580, 708 S.W.2d at 85-86.
44 107 S. Ct. 430-31 (1986).
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termine the constitutional validity of the Arkansas per se rule excluding hypnotically refreshed recollection from the testimony of
a criminal defendant. 45 In a five to four decision authored by Justice Blackmun, the majority invalidated the Arkansas per se
rule.4"
The right of a person to testify in his own defense was not
part of the early common law.4" Older modes of trial, most notably compurgation and wager of law, relied on the witnesses produced by the civil or criminal defendant to swear that the
defendant was telling the truth.4
When oaths of decision were
replaced by jury trials, "the [defendant] was naturally deemed incapable of being such a witness." ' Between 1859 and the end of
the nineteenth century, however, every state except Georgia had
enacted statutes affording criminal defendants the right to testify
under oath. 5 0 This reform was based on the supposition that giving the accused an opportunity to take the stand would lead to
the detection of guilt and the protection of innocence:"
The Georgia statute, passed in 1866, expressly retained the
incompetency rule as to persons "charged in any criminal proceeding with the commission of any indictable offense or any offense punishable on summary conviction. '5' 2 The effect of this
incompetency rule was somewhat mitigated in 1868 when Georgia passed a statute allowing a defendant the opportunity to
make an unsworn statement to the court and jury. 3 The United
Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2706.
Id. at 2714-15. Justice Blackmun was joined in his opinion by justices Brennan, Marshall, Powell and Stevens. Id. at 2706.
47 Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 573-74 (1961).
48 Id. at 573. Wager of law is defined as:
the giving of gage or sureties by a defendant in an action of debt that at
a certain day assigned he would make his law; that is, would take an oath
in open court that he did not owe the debt, and at the same time bring
with him eleven neighbors (called "compurgators"), who would avow
upon their oaths that they believed in their consciences that he said the
truth.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1416 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis in original).
49 2J. WIoMORE, EVIDENCE § 575, at 682 (3d ed. 1940).
-5( Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 577.
51 Id. at 581.
52 Id. at 570-71 (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 38-416 (1866)).
5 3 Id. at 571 (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 38-415 (1868)). This statute provided:
In all criminal trials, the prisoner shall have the right to make to the
court and jury such statement in the case as he may deem proper in his
defense. It shall not be under oath, and shall have such force only as the
jury may think right to give it. [hey may believe it in preference to the
sworn testimony in the case. The prisoner shall not be compelled to
45
46

1002

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 18:997

States Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of this statute in light of a due process challenge in Ferguson v. Georgia.5 4
In 1960, Ferguson, a criminal defendant on trial for murder,
was called to the stand by his lawyer.5 5 The trial court refused to
allow his counsel to elicit his unsworn statement through questioning. 5" Ferguson argued that this denial was in violation of
the requirement of due process imposed on the states by the
fourteenth amendment. 5 7 The Georgia Supreme Court, in sustaining the trial court's ruling, held that a defendant's constitutional right to the assistance of counsel included only those
actions that were sanctioned by state law.5 8 The United States
Supreme Court disagreed, holding that Georgia's refusal to allow
a criminal defendant's counsel the opportunity to question his
client on the stand was a violation of the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment.5"
The Ferguson Court did not address whether the rights conferred by the compulsory process clause of the sixth amendment
applied to state criminal proceedings through the fourteenth
amendment."" It was not until 1967, six years after Ferguson, that
the Supreme Court settled the incorporation issue in Washington
v. Texas." In that case, Jackie Washington, the defendant, received a fifty-year jail term after being convicted of murder with
malice."2 At trial, Washington testified that Charles Fuller fired
the shotgun that killed a teenage boy."' The defendant also
answer any questions on cross-examination, should he think proper to
decline to answer.
Id.
54 365 U.S. 570 (1961).
55
56

Id. at 571.
Id.

57 Id.

Id. at 571-72.
Id. at 596. Ferguson did not challenge the constitutionality of the Georgia
"incompetency" statute. Id. at 572. He raised only the question of Georgia's application of its "sworn statement" statute preventing his lawyer from questioning him
on the stand. Id. For this reason, the Supreme Court did not invalidate Georgia's
"incompetency" statute. See id. at 572 & n.1, 596. Justices Frankfurter and Clark,
in two concurring opinions, asserted that the Court should hold the incompetency
statute unconstitutional under the mandates of the due process clause. Id. at 598603 (Frankfurter, J. & Clark, J., concurring opinions).
6o The compulsory process clause of the sixth amendment provides the right to
be heard and to offer testimony, the right to remain silent and the right to repre58
51)

sentation. U.S. CONST. amend. V, VI.
"l
62

388 U.S. 14 (1967).
Id. at 15.

3 Id. at 15-16.
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claimed that he tried to dissuade Fuller from pulling the trigger
and that he fled the scene before the gun was fired."4 Fuller, already serving a jail term for the murder, was willing to corroborate Washington's story and testify on his behalf."5 The
prosecution objected on the basis of two state statutes which prevented "persons charged as principals, accomplices or accessories in the same crime" from testifying on behalf of each other.""
The Texas trial court, sustaining the state's objection, ruled that
Fuller could not testify."7 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
affirmed." 8
The United States Supreme Court reversed."'" Holding that
state criminal proceedings are controlled by the sixth amendment, the Court rejected the common law presumption that a
state's interest in preventing perjury outweighed the right of a
defendant to present witnesses.7 ' Under Texas law, an accused
accomplice could not testify on behalf of the defense, but could
testify for the state. 7 ' The Court decided that this double standard encouraged perjury because an accomplice would have a
good reason to cooperate with the state and testify against the
interest of his partner. 2 Further, the Court noted that Texas law
permitted an accused accomplice to testify on behalf of the defense only if he was acquitted at his own trial. 7' He could then
exonerate his comrade knowing full well that he could incriminate himself without any fear of reprisal." For these reasons, the
Supreme Court held that the state of Texas had arbitrarily prevented a competent witness from giving testimony that was "rele75
vant and material to the defense."
Several years later, in Chambers v. Mississippi,7" the Supreme
Court settled another controversy that matched the state's rules
"4

Id. at 16.

65 Id.
00 Id. at 16 & n.4. The two statutes at issue in this case, Article 82 of the Texas
Penal Code and Article 711 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure were repealed in 1965. Id. at 17-18 n.4.
67 Id. at 17.

" Id.
69 Id. at 23.
70

Id. at 20-21.

71 Id.

Id.
Id. at 23.
Id.
Id. The Court did note, however, that their decision did not affect statutes
governing testimonial privileges or mental infirmity or infancy. Id. at 23 n.21.
7" 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
72

73
74
75
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of evidence against the right of a criminal defendant to offer relevant testimony. 77 Chambers was brought to trial for the murder
of a police officer, despite repeated confessions by a man named
Gabe McDonald.7 1 McDonald, however, repudiated his confession both before and during the trial. M Chambers filed a pretrial motion asking that he be allowed to question McDonald as
an "adverse" witness should the prosecution fail to call him as a
witness.8" The trial judge agreed that McDonald should be required to appear, but reserved his right to rule on Chambers'
motion.81
At trial, Chambers called McDonald as a witness when the
state failed to put him on the stand." McDonald admitted to the
out-of-court confession, but on cross-examination the state also
elicited his repudiation. 8" Chambers then renewed his motion to
cross-examine McDonald as an adverse witness.8 4 The trial judge
denied Chambers' motion on the basis of the Mississippi
"voucher" rule that precluded a party from impeaching his own
witness.8 5 Chambers then attempted to introduce the testimony
of three men to whom McDonald had admitted the murder on
separate occasions. 8" The judge held that the hearsay rule excluded their testimony despite Chambers' argument that McDonald's statements were an exception to the hearsay rule as
declarations against interest.8 7 Chambers was found guilty of
See id. at 294.
Id. at 287-88.
7,) Id. at 288.
80 Id. at 291.
81 Id.
77
78

82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.

The State of Mississippi argued that an "adverse" witness would be someone testifying against the interests of the defendant. Id. at 297. The Supreme Court
rejected this argument, holding that McDonald's testimony, while exculpating him,
incriminated Chambers. Id.
85 Id. at 291-92, 294. The "voucher" rule is a common law rule that precludes a
party from impeaching his own witness. Id. at 295. The rule stems from an English
trial practice of selecting witnesses to vouch for one's own veracity. Id. at 296.
Therefore, it was expected that a defendant "would stand firmly behind" that witness' testimony. Id. See 3J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 876, at 658-60 (1970); C. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 38, at 75-78 (2d ed. 1972). The "voucher" rule is rejected by
the Federal Rules of Evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 607.
86 Chambers, 410 U.S. at 292-93.
87 Id. at 293, 298-303. " 'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing offered in evidence to provide the
truth of the matter asserted." FED. R. EvID. 801.
As noted by the Chambers Court, a declaration against interest is one of the
most common exceptions to the hearsay rule. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 299. Missis-
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murder." The United States Supreme Court reversed and held
that the application of the Mississippi voucher rule under these
circumstances deprived Chambers of a trial in accordance with
due process."' The Court further asserted that state rules of evidence could not be applied mechanically to defeat the fundamental right of a defendant to present witnesses...(
Whether the inclusion or exclusion of hypnotically induced
testimony affronts the guarantees of the sixth amendment has led
to a body of decisions by state and federal courts that is both
complex and diverse. ' The approaches adopted by these courts
can be divided into four categories.' 2- The majority of state and
federal courts hold post-hypnotic testimony admissible per se
A smaller,
and leave the issue of credibility to the trier of fact.
but growing number of states have adopted a per se rule of inadmissibility which excludes all post-hypnotic testimony as untrustworthy.' 4 No federal court seems to have adopted this
approach. 5 Several state and federal courts have developed prosippi, however, recognized this exception only when a pecuniary interest was at
risk. Id. When the penal interest of a declarant was at issue, Mississippi refused to
apply the exception to the hearsay rule. Id.
88 Id. at 285.
89 Id. at 302-03.

90 Id. at 302.
9 See infra notes 113-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of the various

approaches that have been adopted by state and federal courts in deciding whether
to include or exclude post-hypnosis testimony.
92 See Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2712-13 nn.14-16.
3' See Harding v. State, 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1969) (establishing view that post-hypnosis testimony is admissible per se); see also infa notes 98-112 (discussing Harding);see generalv State v. Brown, 337 N.W.2d 138 (N.D. 1983); State v. Glebock, 616 S.W.2d 897
('enn. Crim. App. 1981); Chapman v. State, 638 P.2d 1280 (Wyo. 1982) (holding
post-hypnosis testimony admissible per se).
,14See State v.Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980) (the leading case holding
post-hypnosis testimony inadmissible per se); see also infra notes 113-118 (discussing .Mack).

See also Contreras v. State, 718 P.2d 129, 139 (Alaska 1986); see, e.g., People v.
Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 22-23, 641 P.2d 775, 776, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1982); Rodriquez v. State, 327 So.2d 903, 904 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); State v. Haislip, 237
Kan. 461, 482, 701 P.2d 909, 925 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1022 (1985); People
v. Nixon, 421 Mich. 79, 88, 364 N.W.2d 593, 598 (1984); People v. Hangslebaen,
86 Mich. App. 718, 728, 273 N.W.2d 539, 543-44 (1978); People v. Hughes, 59
N.Y.2d 523, 548, 453 N.E.2d 484, 497, 466 N.Y.S.2d 255, 268 (1983); Jones v.
State, 542 P.2d 1316, 1326-27 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975) (recently adopting a per se
rule of inadmissibility).
One court recently observed that states adopting rules of per se inadmissibility
represent a new majority view. See Haselhuhn v. State, 727 P.2d 280, 288 (Wyo.
1986) (Brown, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 1321 (1987).
115 The federal courts, like the state courts, have adopted various approaches in
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cedural guidelines that must be applied in answering the question of admissibility.9 " Finally, a few jurisdictions have promoted
a strict case-by-case approach where the trier of fact determines
to what extent, if any, hypnosis has affected the witness' ability to
testify and to be cross-examined. 7
In Harding v. State, ' the Maryland Court of Special Appeals
set the precedent for the per se rule of admissibility in criminal
cases when it affirmed a trial court's decision to allow posthypnosis testimony.9 ' Mildred Coley was shot in the chest and
her body dumped on a deserted road.' 0 0 Later, her assailant returned, moved her by car to another location, raped her, and
then left.""' The victim remembered the details up to the time of
the shooting very clearly." 12- She was, however, confused about
what followed and her memory was restored only after hypnosis.'111 The trial court allowed in as evidence the victim's hypnotically induced testimony and Harding, the defendant, was
subsequently convicted of "assault with intent to rape and assault
1 4
with intent to murder."

On appeal, Harding argued that the testimony concerning
the rape was inadmissible because it was hypnotically induced. '
The court initially ruled that the question of admissibility caused
deciding whether to admit post-hypnosis testimony. See, e.g., McQueen v. Garrison,
814 F.2d 951 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 332 (1987) (Fourth Circuit adopting a
strict case-by-case approach). See also infra notes 147-160 and accompanying text
(discussing McQueen v.Garrison).
See also United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
885 (1979) (Ninth Circuit following jurisdictions that hold hypnosis effects the
credibility, not the admissibility of evidence); cf. Wicker v. McCotter, 783 F.2d 487
(5th Cir.), cerl. denied, 478 U.S. 1010 (1986); Beck v. Norris, 801 F.2d 242 (6th Cir.
1986); Sprynczynatyk v.General Motors Corp., 771 F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1986), cerl.
denied, 475 U.S. 1046 (1986) (federal circuit courts adopting other approaches).
9( See State v.Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981) (leading case establishing
procedural guidelines). See also infra notes 121-46 and accompanying text (discussing Hurd).
97 See McQueen v. Garrison, 814 F.2d 951 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 332
(1987) (Fourth Circuit adopting a strict case-by-case approach). See also infa notes
147-160 and accompanying text (discussing McQueen v. Garrison). See generallv
Wicker v. McCotter, 783 F.2d 487 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010 (1986); State
v. Iwakiri, 106 Idaho 618, 682 P.2d 571 (1984) (adopting case-by-case approach).
98 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1968), cerl. denied, 395 U.S.
949 (1969).
9 See id. at 247, 246 A.2d at 312.
Id. at 232-33, 246 A.2d at 304.
101 See id. at 233, 235, 246 A.2d at 304, 305-06.
102 See id. at 233-34, 246 A.2d at 304-05.
103 Id. at 234-35, 246 A.2d at 305.
104 Id. at 232, 246 A.2d at 304.
105 Id. at 235-36, 246 A.2d at 306.
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no difficulty.'0 " The court noted that Coley's testimony on the
stand was from her own recollection. 0 7 The Maryland court
stated that the fact that her present knowledge was the product of
hypnosis should be a concern to the trier of fact who will ultimately decide how much weight the testimony should be
assigned. '
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed the trial
court's ruling."° ' Without evaluating the reliability of hypnosis,
the court held that the facts on the record supported the jury's
finding of guilt on the rape charge.l"° In listing the evidence adduced below, the court noted that "there was sufficient corroboration of the witness' testimony" to affirm the conviction.'
The majority of state and federal jurisdictions which have
considered the issue of whether to admit hypnotically enhanced
testimony have followed Harding."'2 The leading criminal case
rejecting the Harding approach was State v. Mack." 3 In Mack, as
1oi Id. at 236, 246 A.2d at 306.
107 Id.

Io" Id. In a precautionary instruction, however, the trial judge advised the jury
that the post-hypnosis testimony should not be given any greater weight than any
other testimony. Id. at 244, 246 A.2d at 310.
lo! Id. at 246-47, 246 A.2d at 312.
I 0 Id. at 247, 246 A.2d at 312. The appellate court added that an expert performed the hypnosis procedure and testified that in his opinion "there was no reason to doubt the truth of the witness' statement." Id.
I
ld.
112 Wyoming, for example, adopted the Harding rule in Chapman v. State, 638
P.2d 1280 (Wyo. 1982). In Chapman, a victim of an assault from a burglary was
unable to give a satisfactory description of the assailant until after submitting to
hypnosis on two occasions. Id. On the basis of the description elicited under hypnosis, the victim identified Chapman in a photograph as his assailant. Id.
The Wyoming court, following Harding, held that the testimony of the previously hypnotized witness was properly admitted and that the value of such evidence
could be impeached through cross-examination of the witness and hypnosis, an
attack on credibility of the evidence and expert testimony.

Id. at 1284-85.

The

court concluded that there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to
admit the hypnotically enhanced testimony. Id. at 1286.
Although Maryland set the precedent for holding post-hypnosis testimony admissible per se, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals eventually qualified Harding
in Polk v. State, 48 Md. App. 382, 427 A.2d 1041 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981). In
that case, the Maryland court noted that it had not assessed the Frye rule when it
rendered its opinion in Harding. Id. at 392, 427 A.2d at 1047. As a result, the court
instructed each trial court to apply the Frye rule and to determine on a case-by-case
basis whether the hypnotically refreshed testimony should be admitted. Id. at 395,
427 A.2d at 1048-49. Later, in Collins v. State, 52 Md. App. 186, 447 A.2d 1272
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982), the Maryland Court of Special Appeals expressly overruled IHarding, and adopted a per se rule of inadmissibility. Id. at 205, 447 A.2d at
1283.
'
292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980). In Mack, Marion Erickson met David Roy
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in most other cases included in this second category, the State of
Minnesota adopted a per se rule of inadmissibility.'"4 Relying on
Frye v. United States, which held that "scientific evidence" should
not be admitted unless the appropriate scientific community acknowledged the technique as generally reliable,' ' the Minnesota
Supreme Court concluded that hypnosis, as a method of refreshing a witness' memory, is not scientifically reliable.'"' Faced with
the question of whether to admit or exclude post-hypnosis testimony, the Minnesota court found that "[a]lthough hypnotically
adduced 'memory' is not strictly analogous to the results of
mechanical testing, we are persuaded that the Frye rule is equally
applicable in this context.""'' 7 The Minnesota court, therefore,
held such testimony inadmissible as a matter of law.'"
While jurisdictions adopting per se rules of inadmissibility
are a growing minority, there are a few jurisdictions taking a very
different approach."" These courts have developed procedural
safeguards to be applied on a case-by-case basis.' 2 0 The leading
opinion in this third line of cases is State v. Hurd.'"' In Hurd,Jane
Mack in a bar and eventually accompanied him to a motel. Id. at 766. Erickson was
taken by ambulance to a hospital for a single deep cut found in her vagina. Id. She
was, however, unable to remember anything about that night. Id. Six weeks later,
under hypnosis, she accused Mack of stabbing her. Id. at 767. Mack was charged
with aggravated sexual assault. Id. The trial court, following Minnesota procedure,
stayed the prosecution and certified the question of admissibility of post-hypnosis
testimony to the state supreme court. Id. at 765 n.1.
''4
Id. (citing Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923)).
' 1 293 F. at 1014. In Frye, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit concluded that the results of a polygraph test were inadmissible
evidence. Id.
'";
Iack, 292 N.W.2d at 768-69.
1 17 Id. A few courts have held that Fre does not apply to the testimony of previously hypnotized witnesses. See, e.g., United States v. Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196, 120001 (5th Cir. 1984); Brown v. State, 426 So.2d 76, 85-90 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983);
State v. Seager, 341 N.W.2d 420, 429 (Iowa 1983); State v. Brown, 337 N.W.2d
138, 148-49 (N.D. 1983); State v. Armstrong, 110 Wis.2d 555, 567-68, 329 N.W.2d
386, 393, cerl. denied, 461 U.S. 946 (1983).
11 Id. at 772.
''9
See State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981) (leading case developing
procedural guidelines that allow courts to decide on a case-by-case basis whether
hypnotically-adduced testimony may be admitted). See infra notes 121-46 and accompanying text.
120 See, e.g., Spryncznatyk v. General Motors Corp., 771 F.2d 1112, 1122-23 (8th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1046 (1986); House v. State, 445 So.2d 815, 826-27
(Miss. 1984); State v. Beachum, 97 N.M. 682, 689, 643 P.2d 246, 253 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1981); State v. Weston, 16 Ohio App. 3d 279, 287, 475 N.E.2d 805, 813
(1984); State v. Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d 555, 570, 329 N.W.2d 386, 394, cert. denied,
461 U.S. 946 (1983).
121 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981).

19881

NOTES

1009

Sell was sexually assaulted and repeatedly stabbed in her bedroom.122 Unable to identify her assailant, she underwent hypnosis. ' A trained psychologist induced the hypnosis, but two
detectives, present throughout the session, also questioned
Sell. 124 One detective asked a series of blatantly leading questions which resulted in Sell identifying Paul Hurd, her former
husband, as the attacker. 2 5 Following this recall, the detective
also encouraged Sell, who expressed doubts, to accept the identification she had made and to sign a statement naming Hurd as
her assailant. 126
Hurd argued that Sell's hypnotically refreshed recollection
must be excluded because it failed to meet the reliability standards demanded by the Frye rule. 12 7 The trial court agreed that
Frye applied. '2 ' However, unlike the approach taken in Mack and
its progeny, the trial court rejected the contention that Frye required the court to find consensus among the experts certifying
the general reliability of hypnotically enhanced recall.' 2 9 Instead
of adopting a per se rule for or against the exclusion of posthypnosis testimony, the trial court devised a two-part test to determine admissibility.'
The first part required the application
of six procedural safeguards: (1) the hypnosis must be conducted
by a licensed psychiatrist or psychologist; (2) the licensed professional must be independent of the prosecution, investigation or
defense; (3) pre-hypnotic information offered by the witness
must be in writing; (4) the witness must give a full account of his
Id. at 529, 432 A.2d at 88.
Id. at 530, 432 A.2d at 88.
124 Id. at 530-31, 432 A.2d at 88-89.
125 Id. at 531, 432 A.2d at 89. The court reported the dialogue between the
detective and Mrs. Sell as follows:
"Jane, I want you to think very, very hard of what you are seeing right
now. It's up to you to help me. It is up to you now to describe for me
what yoI see. Is it somebody that you knowJane?" Mrs. Sell answered,
"Yes." "Is it David, Jane?" "'No," Mrs. Sell cried. "Is it Paul?" "Yes."
Mrs. Sell responded emotionally.
Id. "David" referred to David Sell, Jane Sell's husband at the time of the attack. Id.
at 530, 432 A.2d at 88. Mr. Sell was considered a suspect. Id.
12( Id. at 53 1-32, 432 A.2d at 89.
127 Id. at 532, 432 A.2d at 89.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 537, 432 A.2d at 92.
1'-3 Id. at 532-33, 432 A.2d at 89-90. The trial court established the two-part test
because it found that "the potential for the production of fantasy and confabulation" mitigated against a rule of per se admissibility. Id. The procedural safeguards adopted by the New Jersey court were suggested by Dr. Martin Orne, an
expert witness for the defense. Id. at 533, 432 A.2d at 89.
122
123'
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or her memory to the hypnotist prior to hypnosis; (5) all sessions
between the hypnotist and the witness must be recorded, ideally
on videotape; (6) no other individuals may be permitted to observe or participate in the hypnosis.' 3 ' The second part of the
test required the state to establish by "clear and convincing evidence" that these standards had been met.'13 2 After applying
these safeguards to the facts on record, the trial court granted
33
Hurd's motion to suppress the testimony. '
In affirming the trial court's opinion, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey rejected a per se rule of inadmissibility as unnecessarily broad.'3 4 Finding that the "use of hypnosis to refresh memory satisfies the Frye standard in certain instances," the court
reasoned that hypnosis, unlike a polygraph, was not intended to
exact the truth.13 1 Instead, hypnosis induced a person to "concentrate on past events and volunteer previously unrevealed
statements concerning the event."'' 6 Because hypnosis can be
deemed reasonably reliable if it yields recollections "as accurate
as those of an ordinary witness," the New Jersey court held that
3 7
the Frye standard was satisfied.'1
The court also reasoned that hypnotically adduced testimony was as reliable as other eyewitness testimony.1'- Accepting
the testimony of expert witnesses produced at the trial below, the
court found that hypnosis was generally as reliable as ordinary
recall when used in "appropriate cases and where properly conducted."'"
The New Jersey court held that post-hypnosis testimony was admissible in a criminal proceeding provided that the
131 Id. 432 A.2d at 89-90 (quoting State v. Hurd, 173 N.J. Super. 333, 363
(1980)).
132 Id., 432 A.2d at 90.
133 Id. at 532, 432 A.2d at 90.
134 Id. at 541, 432 A.2d at 94.
135 Id. at 537-38, 432 A.2d at 92. Justice Pashman stated that the purpose of
hypnosis is to "overcom[e] amnesia and restor[e] the memory of a witness." Id. at
537, 432 A.2d at 92.
1361 Id. (quoting State v. Hurd, 173 N.J. Super. 333, 361, 414 A.2d 291, 305 (Law
Div. 1980)).
137 Id. at 538, 432 A.2d At 92. The New Jersey Supreme Court stated:
If Ihypnosis] is conducted properly and used only in appropriate cases,
hypnosis is generally accepted as a reasonably reliable method of restoring a person's memory. Consequently, hypnotically-induced testimony
may be admissible if the proponent of the testimony can demonstrate
that the use of hypnosis in the particular case was a reasonably reliable
means of restoring memory comparable to normal recall in its accuracy.
Id.
138 See id. at 541, 432 A.2d at 94.
'39 Id. at 543, 432 A.2d at 95.
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trial court determines "that the use of hypnosis in the particular
case was reasonably likely to result in recall comparable in accuracy to normal human memory."' 4 0 Although the court would allow an opponent to challenge the application of the procedural
safeguards, it would not permit a challenge on the general reliability of hypnosis.' 4 ' Finally, the court directed the trier of fact to
determine the amount of weight that should be assigned to the
hypnotically enhanced testimony.'4
The Supreme Court of New Jersey also agreed with the trial
court's decision to require that the admissibility of post-hypnosis
testimony be established by clear and convincing evidence.' 4 "
Although this standard imposed a heavy burden on the use of
hypnosis, the court reasoned that it was justified.'" Given the
risks associated with hypnosis, the court wanted to "assure strict
compliance with the procedural guidelines" set forth in its opinion. " In short, the court wanted post-hypnosis testimony introduced into evidence only when it could be shown to be
reasonably accurate. 146
Despite the varied approaches represented by the three lines
140 Id.
141 Id.
Justice Pashman explained that an opponent could challenge the hypnotically enhanced testimony by examining the reliability of the procedures used
through expert testimony. Id.

142
143

Id.
Id. at 546, 432 A.2d at 97-98. The New Jersey court imposed a clear and

convincing standard only when a party was attempting to introduce hypnosis into a
criminal proceeding. Id. at 547 n.6, 432 A.2d at 97 n.6. The court did not decide
whether the same standard would be imposed in a civil proceeding. Id. The court
also expressly refused to decide whether the procedural guidelines would have to
be met in a civil trial. Id. At minimum, the court stated that it would require a
recording of the hypnotic session. Id.
144 Id. at 547, 432 A.2d at 97. This burden, according to the court "is justified by
the potential for abuse of hypnosis, the genuine likelihood of suggestiveness and
error, and the consequent risk of injustice." Id.
14 5 Id.
146 Id. The supreme court, however, disagreed with one portion of the trial
court's holding concerning the burden of proof. Id. at 548, 432 A.2d at 97. Usually, the criminal defendant bears the burden of proving that a pre-trial identification was "so suggestive as to result in a substantial likelihood of misidentification,"
and a violation of due process. Id. The trial court, however, because of the
problems associated with hypnosis, imposed the clear and convincing standard on
the state, holding that it should bear the burden of proving that the hypnotically
adduced recall was generally reliable under the totality of the given circumstances.
Id. The New Jersey Supreme Court disagreed, holding that since the state would
be held to a clear and convincing standard for proving the general reliability of the
hypnosis in each specific situation, the burden would remain on the defendant to
demonstrate any showing of suggestiveness resulting in a constitutional violation.
Id., 432 A.2d at 98.
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of cases presented above, yet another strategy was adopted by
the Fourth Circuit in McQueen v. Garrison.147 In that case, McQueen was convicted of multiple murders in a North Carolina
state court when the key prosecution witness testified as to having seen McQueen commit the murders. 48 Initially, the witness
claimed to have heard the shots, but not to have seen the shootings."' Under hypnosis, however, the witness related very specific details of the murders and remembered watching McQueen
execute two women.' 0 McQueen was convicted and the
5
Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed.' '
McQueen then requested a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, contending
that the inclusion of the hypnotically enhanced testimony
breached his rights under the sixth and fourteenth amendments.1'5 2 The district court, finding that McQueen had received
a fundamentally fair trial, dismissed the fourteenth amendment
claim.' 5 ' The district court, however, granted the writ on the
ground that the inclusion of the hypnotically enhanced testimony
had impinged impermissibly on McQueen's sixth amendment
right to confront the witness.' 5 4 The Court of Appeals for the
55
Fourth Circuit reversed.'
The Fourth Circuit found none of the approaches adopted
by other jurisdictions satisfactory.' 5' According to the circuit
court, both per se rules were inadequate because they gave no
discretion to the courts. 15 7 The procedural approach taken by
the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Hurd was better, but
still deficient, according to the circuit court because testimony,
shown trustworthy and probative, could still be excluded if the
hypnosis was found procedurally faulty.' 5' As an alternative, the
Fourth Circuit offered a strict case-by-case approach that re'47
148
141)

814 F.2d 951 (4th Cir.), ceri. denied, 108 S. Ct. 332 (1987).
Id. at 953.
Id.

150 1,1.
15'
152
153
154
155
156

Id. at 952 n.2.
Id. at 952.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 956-59.

157 See id. at 958.
158 See id. at 959. Judge Sprouse posited that "[in our view, however, the reliability of the hypnosis procedure does not assure admissibility, nor does demonstrated unreliability necessarily mean the hypnotically enhanced testimony is not
admissible." Id.
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quired a balancing test."5'1 The circuit court concluded that
based on the specific facts in a case, a court could decide whether
a witness' memory and ability to testify had been impaired by the
hypnotic experience. ,6o
In Rock v. Arkansas,'" Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority of the Supreme Court, did not invalidate any of the various
approaches adopted by courts throughout the United States in
their efforts to decide whether to admit or exclude hypnotically
adduced testimony in criminal proceedings."" The Court, however, did invalidate Arkansas' per se rule of inadmissibility as applied to a criminal defendant.'"" The Court, by first stressing the
holdings in Washington '64 and Chambers,'" 5 emphasized that state
criminal proceedings must honor the dictates of the sixth and
fourteenth amendments."" The majority also acknowledged that
a defendant's right to offer relevant testimony was not absolute
since a state retained a legitimate interest in regulating its criminal trial process;" 7 but the State could not apply these evidentiary rules in an arbitrary or disproportionate way.'"" The Court
required states to consider whether their legitimate interests outweighed the constitutional right of defendants to offer
testimony.'
The Rock majority held that the Supreme Court of Arkansas
15'9 d. at 958. The district court relied on its holding in Harker v. State of Maryland, 800 F.2d 437 (4th Cir. 1986). Harker, while adopting a "middle ground,"
protected a defendant against the problems associated with hypnosis (i.e., suggestibility, confabulation and "memory hardening") by requiring courts to conduct a
balanced inquiry to determine that the hypnotically refreshed recollection be free
of these dangers. See Harker, 800 F.2d at 440-43.
'((
See VcQueen, 814 F.2d at 958.
'('

107 S. Ct. 2704 (1987).

1i62 See id. at 2708-15. Justice Blackmun was joined in his opinion by Justices
Brennan, Marshall, Powell and Stevens. Id. at 2706.
Until Rock, the Supreme Court had consistently denied certiorari in cases that
challenged a court's rule concerning post-hypnosis testimony, whether the rule be
one of per se admissibility, per se inadmissibility, or where procedural safeguards
have been adopted. See, e.g., Sprynczynatyk v. General Motors Corp., 771 F.2d
1112 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1046 (1986); State v. Haislip, 237 Kan.
461, 701 P.2d 909, cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1022 (1985); Harding v. State, 5 Md.App.
230, 246 A.2d 302 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1969); State
v. Armstrong, 110 Wis.2d 555, 329 N.W.2d 386, cert. denied, 461 U.S. 946 (1983).
1-'3Rock, 107 S.Ct. at 2714-15.
164 See supra notes 61-75 and accompanying text.
165 See supra notes 76-90 and accompanying text.
I"i"
See Rock, 107 S.Ct. at 2710-1I.
1'7 Id. at 2711.
I (is Id.
'"9

Id.
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had minimized impermissibly the right of a criminal defendant to
testify in her own defense. 170 According to the Court, although a
state could legitimately advance an interest in barring unreliable
evidence, the sixth amendment required compelling justification
for any rule which totally excluded a criminal defendant's testimony. ,' The Justice reasoned that Arkansas could not arbitrarily invalidate all post-hypnosis testimony of a criminal defendant
unless it could clearly demonstrate that all such recollections are
invalid. 172 According to the Court, Arkansas had failed to make
any such showing. 7 1 In fact, the majority concluded that Arkansas had done little more than rely on the rationale and decisions
of other jurisdictions that had adopted a per se rule of
inadmissibility. 17
In finding the Arkansas per se rule unconstitutional, the
Supreme Court acknowledged that the use of hypnosis in criminal proceedings is still a controversial subject among the medical
and legal communities."' Noting that the debate continues over
the typical individual's response to hypnosis, the Court found
that most experts agree that the technique usually increases
"both correct and incorrect recollection." ' ' 76 Justice Blackmun
opined that incorrect recollection, usually the product of suggestibility, confabulation, and "memory hardening," sometimes
renders hypnotically enhanced testimony unreliable and undermines effective cross-examination. 7 7 On the other hand, the
'7)
'71

Id. at 2714.
id.
Id.

172
173 Id.
174 See id.

Arkansas claimed to have relied on the findings and rationale of People
v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 723 P.2d 1354, cert. denied, 459 U.S.
860 (1982) in adopting its per se rule of inadmissibility. See Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2712
n. 15. The Shirley court adopted a per se rule of inadmissibility however, it is limited
to witnesses and not to criminal defendants. See Shirley, 31 Cal.3d at 67, 181 Cal.
Rptr. at 273, 723 P.2d at 1384.
Initially, courts that barred all post-hypnosis testimony usually prohibited the
witness from testifying at all. See, e.g., State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226, 232, 624 P.2d
1274, 1280 (1981) (holding all testimony of a witness was barred from the moment
hypnosis occurred). Mena later was reversed in part by Collins v. Superior Court,
132 Ariz. 180, 209-10, 644 P.2d 1266, 1295-96 (1982) (holding disqualifying witnesses who clearly remembered details prior to hypnosis would foster injustice).
Id. See also Contreras v. State, 718 P.2d 129, 139-40 (Alaska 1986) (holding a witnesses competent to testify to facts remembered prior to hypnosis, despite the
court's decision to adopt a rule of per se inadmissibility).
'75 See Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2713 (citing Counsel on Scientific Affairs, Scientific Statis
of Refreshing Recollection by the Use of Hypnosis, 253 J.A.M.A. 1918, 1918-19 (1985)).
176 Id. (footnote omitted).
177 Id.
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Court also acknowledged that hypnosis has been found to be a
valid and reliable technique in obtaining investigative leads and

identifications. 178
The Rock Court also noted that many jurisdictions eschewed
a per se rule and allowed hypnotically enhanced testimony despite the known risks. 7'
Focusing on jurisdictions that have
adopted procedural safeguards, the Court found that although
these safeguards did not eliminate the problems, they did reduce
them."" According to the Court, the most noteworthy of these
safeguards included using a trained psychiatrist or psychologist
independent of the investigation, conducting the hypnosis in a
neutral setting, and recording all sessions on audio or video
tapes."81 In addition to these specially formulated safeguards,
the Court stressed that the traditional means of assessing accuracy remained applicable to post-hypnosis testimony.'
These
included corroborating evidence, cross-examination, expert testimony explaining the problems associated with hypnosis and cautionary instructions to the jury."'
Applying these factors to the case at bar, the Supreme Court
concluded that Arkansas had impermissibly prevented Mrs. Rock
from taking the stand in her own defense." 4 The majority observed that the credentials of the psychologist, the finding that
no leading questions were asked during hypnosis, the taping of
all sessions and the corroborating evidence from the gun expert
were circumstances that should have been considered by the trial
court in deciding whether Mrs. Rock's post-hypnosis testimony
was reliable and admissible. 5 Arkansas' per se rule of inadmissibility, however, prevented the trial court from considering
these factors."" For these reasons, the Court held that "Arkansas' per se rule excluding all post-hypnosis testimony infringe[d]
impermissibly on the right of a defendant to testify on his or her
Id. at 2713-14. See also Korger & Douche, IIvpnosis in Ctiminal Investigation, 27
& Exp. HYP. 358 (1979) (discussing how hypnosis has been utilized to
solve major crimes).
179 Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2713 n.16.
18() Id. at 2714.
181 Id. (citing Orne, The Use and Misuse of H4,pnosis in Court, 27 INT'LJ. CLIN. & Exp.
HYP. 311, 335-36 (1979)).
182 Id.
178

INT'LJ. CLIN.

183i Id.
184
185

Id. at 2714-15.
See id. at 2714.

18(i Id.
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own behalf." 18 7
The dissent, authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, stressed
the majority's finding that no set of procedural safeguards could
consistently ensure the reliability of post-hypnosis testimony. 8 '
Despite this recognition, the majority, in Justice Rehnquist's
view, was forcing trial courts to engage in a case-by-case scientific
assessment of reliability each time they confronted the question
of whether to admit hypnotically enhanced testimony.'" Noting
that the Court's deference to states had been traditionally strong
in the administration of justice, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued
that the Court should show even more deference in a situation
where "scientific understanding . . . is still in its infancy.""... In
Chief Justice Rehnquist's view, the Arkansas per se rule was a
legitimate response to a novel and difficult problem."'
The dissent also rejected the majority's holding that the Arkansas rule infringed impermissibly on a defendant's constitutional right to testify in her own defense.'"" Chief Justice
Rehnquist asserted that the cases cited by the majority clearly
maintained that a criminal defendant's right to present evidence
was not absolute either under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment or under the compulsory clause of the sixth
amendment. 193 These cases also demonstrated that a criminal
defendant's right to present evidence must often bow to a state's
legitimate interests in managing the criminal trial process. 19 4 According to the Chief Justice, the Constitution does not exempt a
criminal defendant from following rules designed by a state "to
assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt
or innocence."'" Since hypnotically induced testimony was considered inherently suspect, the Arkansas per se rule of inadmissibility was a valid attempt to ensure a trustworthy result in a
criminal proceeding.".. The Chief Justice asserted the Constitu187

Id. at 2714-15.

188 Id. at 2715 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting). ChiefJustice Rehnquist was joined by

Justices White, O'Connor and Scalia. Id.
189 Id.
'1" Id. at 2716 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2714 (majority opinion)).
19 1 Id.
192 Id. at 2715 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
1!)- Id. at 2716 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410
U.S. 284, 295 (1973); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22 (1967); In re Oliver,
333 U.S. 257, 273, 275 (1948)).
194

Id.

19 5

Id. (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 289, 302 (1973)).

196 Id.
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tion does not authorize the Supreme Court to dictate how this
7
issue should be handled by the individual states.11
The Rock decision acknowledges that the reliability of hypnosis as a scientific method of proof in criminal proceedings is still
widely debated. The majority of the Court, however, also recognizes that hypnosis has the potential to contribute significantly to
the truth-seeking function of trials, i.e., the detection of guilt and
the protection of innocence. In accounting for both the benefits
and liabilities of hypnosis, the Supreme Court rendered a decision that encourages courts to allow hypnotically adduced testimony when it seems reliable and to repudiate the testimony when
it seems untrustworthy. The Rock decision, at least in the way
that it effects a criminal defendant, seems to fit neatly into a legal
system that confidently and deliberately protects the criminally
accused while concomitantly preserving state authority.
The Rock Court, however, declined the opportunity to adopt
a rule that would apply equally to all hypnotically adduced testimony in criminal cases, whether offered by the prosecution or
the defense."" Instead, the Court, by relying on cases like Ferguson, Washington, and Chambers, preserved the rights of a criminal
defendant by reminding the state that its criminal proceedings
must honor the dictates of the sixth and fourteenth amendments.
On the other hand, the Rock Court, by rendering a narrow holding made it equally clear that the Supreme Court has no desire to
interfere with a state's sovereignty. Clearly, this holding raises
the question as to whether Rock prohibits a state from applying a
per se rule of inadmissibility to a criminal defense witness. If the
fundamental purpose of the trial process is to ascertain the truth,
then the answer to this question should be "yes," and there can
be no valid distinction made between a criminal defendant and a
criminal defense witness. By expressly refusing to settle this
question, however, the Court implied that the answer is "no." As
the Rock opinion demonstrates, the Court, in criminal proceedings, has historically balanced the rights of a defendant against
the interests of the state. While the balance may tip in favor of
the defendant when the issue is whether she will be allowed to
testify, it seems equally clear that the balance will tip toward the
197 1&

I," The majority noted that Rock "does not involve the admissibility of previously
hypnotized witnesses other than criminal defendants and we express no opinion on
that issue." Id. at 2712 n.15.
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state when a mere defense witness is prevented from taking the
stand.
Furthermore, as a result of the Court's balancing approach,
the Rock holding sanctions each of the distinct and varied rules
that have been adopted by courts throughout the United States
in their efforts to decide whether to admit or exclude hypnotically refreshed recollection in criminal proceedings. More important, the Rock holding does not forbid a state from adopting a
per se rule of inadmissibility; the state is simply prohibited from
applying such a rule to a criminal defendant.
While the Rock decision may be a step in the right direction,
it will not have any significant impact on the criminal justice system. For example, nothing in the Rock decision prevents the Arkansas court on remand from excluding the defendant's
hypnotically refreshed recollection on the ground that the hypnotic sessions were procedurally faulty.' 9 9 For states that have
adopted mandatory procedural guidelines, the problem of a
court's prejudice against hypnosis is inconsequential. For states
that have decided on a per se rule of inadmissibility, the temptation to find all hypnosis procedurally defective may prove too
-' °
hard to resist.
Diane C. Nardone
199 In fact, on remand, the question of how Arkansas would deal with the
Supreme Court opinion became a moot issue when Mrs. Rock changed her plea
from not guilty to guilty, on February 18, 1988. Mrs. Rock was sentenced to three
years in the Arkansas Department of Correction and received a $2,500 fine. State v.
Rock, No. CR-83-338-1 (Ark. Cir. Ct. Feb. 18, 1988).
2oo The Rock Court did not explicitly state whether the prosecution or the defense should bear the burden of proof for establishing whether the hypnoticallyadduced testimony is reliable or not. See Note, Rock v. Arkansas: Hypnosis and the
CriminalDefendant s Right to Testify, 41 ARK. L. REv. 425, 464-72 (1988) for a detailed
discussion of the evidentiary considerations raised by the Rock decision. The note
proposes a model rule of evidence for regulating the admissibility of post-hypnosis
testimony. Id. at 483-86.

